Abstract-Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes that messages are broadcasted between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of specific pre-designed learning dynamics, rather than for a class of learning dynamics. In this paper, we consider the common private goods resource allocation problem: sharing K infinitely divisible resources among strategic agents for their private consumption. We present a distributed mechanism for a set of agents who communicate through a given network. In a distributed mechanism, agents' messages are not broadcast to all other agents as in the standard mechanism design framework, but are exchanged only in the local neighborhood of each agent. The presented mechanism produces a unique NE and fully implements the social welfare maximizing allocation. In addition, the mechanism is budget-balanced at NE. It is also shown that the mechanism induces a game with contractive best-response, leading to guaranteed convergence for all learning dynamics within the Adaptive Best-Response dynamics class, including dynamics such as Cournot bestresponse, k−period best-response and Fictitious Play. We also present a numerical study of convergence under repeated play, for various communication graphs and learning dynamics.
between distributed non-strategic agents, who possess local information and who communicate locally on a network. In mechanism design, a designer designs incentives such that strategic agents "agree" to reveal their relevant private (local) information truthfully. Thus, with the above motivation in mind, a natural question is to ask: can incentives be designed for strategic agents with local private information who communicate locally on a network? One expects that attaining consensus between strategic agents only becomes harder to achieve when message exchange is restricted by the network structure. This aforementioned issue is not to be confused with that of distributed optimization where the problem of local exchange of information has been addressed and to a large extend solved [14] [15] [16] [17] . Neither should it be confused with the local public goods models (e.g., [18] , [19] ), where each agent's utility in the model is already assumed to only depend on his/her neighbors' allocations.
Regarding the second drawback mention above, there is a long line of work investigating stability of NE through learning in games [20] [21] [22] . Theoretically, the notion of NE applies to perfect information settings, i.e., where each agent knows the utility of every other agent. However, for most of the mechanism design works in the literature where NE is used as the solution concept, the models are not necessarily restricted to the perfect information setting. Indeed, in an informationally and physically decentralized system it is natural to assume that agents only know their own utility and no one else's. In such cases, the robustness w.r.t. information available to agents, of any particular designed mechanism is evaluated by the learning guarantees that it can provide. Since agents can't calculate the NE offline, they are expected to learn it by repeatedly playing the induced game whilst adjusting their strategy dynamically using the past observations. The larger the class of learning dynamics that are guaranteed to converge, the more robust the mechanism. The idea of NE being the convergent point of learning dynamics directly relates to the Evolutive interpretation of NE, [23] , where NE even for a single-shot game is interpreted as the stationary point of a dynamic adjustment process. The original thesis of John Nash, [24] , too provides a similar dynamic adjustment interpretation of NE.
In this paper our objective is to design mechanisms that resolve simultaneously both the issues mentioned above. This means that the mechanisms are distributed, i.e., the allocation and tax functions (contracts) obey the communication constraints of a network and for the designed mechanisms theoretical guarantees of convergence, for a sufficiently large class of learning dynamics, can be provided.
The basic idea for achieving this is to identify appropriate properties of games that can lead to convergence of a correspondingly selected class of learning dynamics and then design the mechanism such that the induced game possesses the identified properties. In Milgrom and Roberts [20] , authors identify supermodularity as a critical property of a game and prove that any learning dynamic within the Adaptive Dynamics class is guaranteed to converge between the two most extreme Nash equilibria when the game is played repeatedly. Following this, [25] presents a mechanism for the Lindahl allocation problem such that the induced game is supermodular. Healy and Mathevet in [26] identify contraction as a learning-relevant property of the game and show that any learning dynamic within the Adaptive BestResponse (ABR) dynamics class is guaranteed to converge to the unique NE. They also present a mechanism that induces a contractive game for the Walrasian and Lindahl allocation problems, under the usual broadcast information structure. Authors demonstrate that contraction is a more suitable notion of stability than supermodularity in problems related to economic environments where mechanisms with compact action spaces are not feasible. In a finite type space model i.e., where agents' utility function is chosen from a finite set, author in [27] presents a VCG-style direct mechanism for a dynamic pricing problem such that appropriate incentives are provided for achieving efficient truth-telling NE. For the special case of truth-telling equilibria, the agents do not need to learn NE as they can simply reveal their private information. For our problem, direct mechanisms (such as VCG) are not feasible as we have a continuum of types and thus truth-telling equilibria are not an option. Thus learning NE is an important and non-trivial problem in our setting.
The main contributions of this paper are described below. We define a mechanism through an appropriately designed message space, allocation function and tax function. The allocation and tax functions, for any agent, depend only on the messages of his/her neighbors. The mechanism description contains certain free parameters such that for all values of these parameters the mechanism achieves its goal of full implementation in NE. For the purpose of providing learning guarantees we consider the ABR class of learning dynamics and show that by tuning the free parameters appropriately, the induced game can be made contractive. Section IV describes some well-known learning dynamics that are part of the ABR class. With the aid of numerical analysis, we show that the designed contractive mechanism provides exponential rate of convergence for several instances of our model.
In this paper, Section II defines the centralized allocation problem. The mechanism is presented in Section III along with the main results of efficiency and budget balance. Section IV contains the main result of convergence for the ABR class and a numerical study of convergence for various learning dynamics and communication graphs.
II. MODEL
There are N strategic agents, denoted by the set N = {1, . . . , N}. A directed communication graph G = (N, E) is given, where the vertices correspond to the agents and an edge from vertex i to j indicates that agent i can "listen" to agent j. It is assumed that the given graph G is strongly connected. In this paper, we are interested in the private goods allocation problem which, in Economics literature, is also known as Walrasian allocation problem [28] , [29] .
There are K infinitely divisible goods, denoted by set K = {1, . . . , K}, that are to be distributed among the agents. Each agent receives a utility v i (x i ) based on the profile
) of quantity of each good that he/she receives. Since for each agent, its utility depends only on privately consumed allocation x i and not on other agents' allocation, this is the private goods model. It is assumed that v i : R K → R is a continuously double-differentiable, strictly concave function that for some η > 1 satisfies, for all k ∈ K,
where H −1 is the matrix inverse of the Hessian
To understand the significance of this assumption consider the case of K = 1, then this condition is the same as
It is already assumed that v i (·) is strictly concave, the only additional imposition made by this assumption is that the second derivative of v i (·) is bounded away from 0 and −∞. More generally for K ≥ 1, if the utility is separable,
The above mentioned properties of the utility function are assumed to be common knowledge between agents and the designer. However, the utility function v i (·) itself is known only to agent i and is not known to other agents or the designer. The designer wishes to allocate available goods such that the sum of utilities is maximized subject to availability constraints, i.e., to solve the following centralized allocation problem,
where c k ∈ R is the total available amount of good k ∈ K. The allocation x * is also called the efficient allocation and we assume that it is finite i.e., the optimization is welldefined. The efficient allocation is unique since the utilities are strictly concave. The necessary and sufficient condition for optimality are where λ * k k∈K ∈ R K are the (unique) optimal dual variables for each of the constraints in (3b).
III. A MECHANISM FOR THE PRIVATE GOODS PROBLEM
A one-shot mechanism is defined by the triplet
(5) which consists of, for each agent i ∈ N, the message space M i , the allocation function x i : M → R K and the tax function t i : M → R. The mechanism induces a game, G pvt , for the agents in N, with action space M and utilities
The mechanism is said to fully implement the efficient allocation if
where M NE ⊆ M is the set of all Nash equilibria of game G pvt and x * is the efficient allocation from (3). Furthermore, the mechanism is budget balanced at equilibrium if
Finally, we call the mechanism distributed if for any agent i ∈ N, the allocation x i (·) and tax t i (·) functions instead of depending on the entire message m = (m j ) j∈N , depend only on m i and m j j∈N(i) , i.e., agent i and his/her immediate neighbors. Here N(i) are all the "out"-neighbors of i i.e., there exists an edge from i to j in graph G iff j ∈ N(i) .
A. Mechanism
For the purpose of maintaining clarity in the exposition, the mechanism presented below is for the special case of a single private good, i.e., K = 1. The natural extension to the general case is discussed at the end of this section.
For any agent i ∈ N, the message space is M i = R N +1 . The message m i = (y i , q i ) consists of agent i's demand y i ∈ R for the allocation of the single good and a surrogate/proxy
N for the demand of all the agents (including himself/herself).
Since the graph G = (N, E) is strongly connected, for any pair of vertices i, j ∈ N, the following two quantities are well-defined. d(i, j) is the length of the shortest path from i to j and n(i, j) ∈ N(i) is the out-neighbor of i such that the shortest path from i to j goes through n(i, j). These are depicted in Fig. 1 . The allocation function is defined as
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is an appropriately chosen contraction parameter and its selection is discussed in Section IV on Learning Guarantees, proof of Proposition 2. The tax function is defined as
where n(i, i) ∈ N(i) is an arbitrarily chosen neighbor of i and δ > 0 is an appropriately chosen parameter. Both ξ, δ are tuned simultaneously in the proof of Proposition 2.
B. Results

Fact 1 (Distributed).
The mechanism defined in (9) and (10) is distributed.
The above fact follows from the expressions in (9) and (10) as they depend only on m i and m r r∈N (i) .
Since agents are connected through a given graph, they can only communicate with their neighbors. Yet, as indicated in the optimality conditions, (4), there needs to be two kinds of global consensus at the efficient allocation. Firstly, the sum of allocation to all the agents must equal the total available amount. Secondly, agents also need to agree on a common "price". To facilitate this, the message space consists of the surrogate variables q i = (q 1 i , . . . , q N i ) which are known locally to agent i and are expected at equilibrium to be representative of the global demand y = (y 1 , . . . , y N ). Specifically, the 2 nd , 3 rd and 4 th terms in the tax (10a) are designed to incentivize agents to achieve the aforementioned duplication of global demand y to the local surrogate q i .
To motivate the choice of the allocation function and the remaining part of the tax function consider the case of ξ = 1 and take into account the duplication, i.e., q r = y, ∀ r ∈ N. Since ξ = 1, all the factors involving ξ become 1 for the expressions in (9) and (10) . We design the allocation x i (m) as a function of y i and (q r ) r∈N(i) such that after taking into account the duplication it becomes
This facilitates the first global consensus, i∈N x i = c 1 . One standard design principle for mechanisms is that if an agent partially controls their own allocation (such as here, since x i (m) depends on y i ) then they shouldn't be able to control the price. This is the reason that p i (·) doesn't depend on m i . It is function of (q r ) r∈N (i) and is designed such that after taking into account the duplication, the price for any agent is proportional to j y j . This facilitates the second global consensus -common price for all agents.
Finally, we set ξ < 1 and adjust the allocation and tax function accordingly so that the game G pvt can be contractive (see Section IV).
The best-response of any agent i is defined as
Denote by β = (β 1 , . . . , β N ) : M → M the best-response mapping, which is a set-valued function in general. Proof. Proof is in Appendix I.
Lemma 1 (Concavity
Concavity of the induced utility in the game G pvt largely follows from the tax terms being quadratic. The second tax term in (10a) is the only source of cross derivatives across components of message m i . Concavity is proved by verifying that the Hessian matrix is negative definite.
Proposition 1 (Full Implementation and Budget Balance).
For the game G pvt , there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, m ∈ M, and the allocation at Nash equilibrium is efficient, i.e.,
Further, the total tax paid at Nash equilibrium m is zero, i.e., it satisfies (8) .
Proof. Proof is in Appendix II.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. Since the optimality conditions in (4) are sufficient, we start by showing that at any NE the allocation and price necessarily satisfy the optimality conditions. Thereby ensuring that if NE exists (unique or multiple) the corresponding allocation is efficient. Then we show existence and uniqueness by showing a one-to-one map between message at NE and (x * , λ * ) arising out of the optimization in (3). Generalizing to multiple goods (K > 1): Here we use a per good notation. The message space is
Any message m i = m 
Here both functions, x k i (·) and t k i (·), depend only on m k , the part of the message m pertaining to good k. The expressions for both the functions are the same as in the presented mechanism, (9) and (10), replacing m by m k .
Clearly, the generalized mechanism is distributed as well. Owing to the design with a good-wise separation, we have the following form for utility
Concavity of u i follows from arguments similar to Proposition 1, where we verify the Hessian to be negative definite.
Since the optimality conditions in (4) are sufficient, the properties of efficiency, existence and uniqueness of NE follow from the first order conditions for optimality in the best-response. Finally, the Budget Balance result holds true on a per-good basis, so it also holds for the total tax.
IV. LEARNING GUARANTEES
This section provides the result of guaranteed convergence, for a class of learning algorithms, when the mechanism defined above is played repeatedly. As discussed in the Introduction, such results measure robustness of a mechanism, w.r.t. information available to agents, so as to ascertain if the mechanism is ready for practical applications.
A learning dynamic is represented by (μ n ) n≥1 ⊆ × i∈N Δ(M i ), where μ n is a mixed strategy profile with product structure to be used at time n. Denote by S(μ n ) ⊆ M the support of the mixed strategy profile μ n and denote by m n ∈ S(μ n ) the realized action. Healy and Mathevet in [26] define the Adaptive Best-Response (ABR) dynamics class by restricting the support S(μ n ) in terms of past observed actions. Define the history H n ,n = (m n , m n +1 , . . . , m n−1 ) as the set of observed actions between n and n − 1. Denote by m the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and define B (M ) as the smallest closed ball 2 centered at m that contains the set M ⊂ M. The closed ball is defined with any valid metric d on the message space M.
A learning dynamic is in the ABR class if any point in the support S(μ n ) of the strategy at time n is no further from the NE than the best-response to any action that is no further from NE than the "worst-case" action that has been observed in some finite past {n , . . . , n − 1}. (H n ,n ) )), where β : M → M is the best-response of the game.
Definition 1 (Adaptive Best-Response Learning Class [26]).
A learning dynamic is an adaptive best-response dynamic if
For instance, any learning dynamic that puts belief zero over actions further from NE than the ones that have been observed in the past is in the ABR class. Here are a few examples of well-known learning dynamics in the ABR class. Cournot best-response is defined as S(μ n ) = m n = β(m n−1 ), i.e., at every time agents best-respond to the last round's action. This gives rise to a deterministic strategy at each time. More generally, k−period best-response is defined as the learning dynamic where at any time n, an agent i's strategy is a best-response to the mixed strategy of agents j = i which are created using the observed empirical distribution from the actions of the previous k−rounds i.e., {m j,n−k , . . . , m j,n−1 }. In fact, the generalization of this is also in the ABR class, where at each time n, an agent i's strategy is the best-response to the mixed strategy of agents j = i that is formed by taking any convex combination of the empirical distributions of actions observed in the previous k−rounds. Finally, Fictitious Play [22] , [30] , which maintains empirical distribution of all the past actions (instead of k most recent ones) is also in ABR. The additional requirement for this is that the utility in the game should be strictly concave, which is true in our case (Lemma 1).
We say that a mechanism is contractive if, for any admissible profile (v i (·)) i∈N (as described in Section II) the induced game has a unique 3 best-response β i for any agent i and the overall best-response β = (β i ) i∈N is a contraction mapping. This means that there exists c < 1 such that d (β(x), β(y)) ≤ c d(x, y) , ∀ x, y ∈ M, for some metric d. A standard way to verify contraction mapping is to check ∇β < 1, where ∇β is the Jacobian of β. We use the rowsum norm for calculating the matrix norm of the Jacobian.
Fact 2 ([26, Theorem 1]). If a game is contractive, then all ABR dynamics converge to the unique NE.
It is shown below that the presented mechanism is contractive and thus owing to the above result there is guaranteed convergence for all learning dynamics in the ABR class.
The result in Fact 2 is in the same vein as the one in the seminal work [20] by Milgrom and Roberts. It was shown that Supermodularity ensures convergence for the Adaptive Dynamics (AD) class of learning algorithms. Supermodularity requires that the message space is compact and that the best-response β i (m −i ) is non-decreasing in message m j , for any j = i. Before proceeding, kindly note that contraction does not imply supermodularity (nor vice-versa). Our principle aim is to ensure the property of contraction as designing mechanisms with compact action spaces is not feasible here and thus the result in [20] is not applicable.
Proposition 2 (Contraction). The mechanism defined in Section III-A is contractive but not supermodular. Thus, all learning dynamics within the ABR dynamics class converge to the unique efficient Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proof is in Appendix III.
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 2 can be motivated as follows. By selecting parameter ξ < 1, contraction of best-response for the variables (q r i ) r =i is already ensured. However, for best-response inỹ i ,q i i we need tuning of ξ, δ.
Here it turns out that in order to accommodate any given value of η > 1, ξ needs to be selected close to 1 and then δ needs to be selected as a function of the chosen ξ.
Generalizing to K > 1: The proof of Proposition 2 relies on inverting v i : R → R and bounding it appropriately. For the general case this is the same as inverting ∇v i :
ensures that the determinant of 3 This means β i is a function instead of a correspondence. Also, note that due to Lemma 1, the best-response for our mechanism is unique. Hessian of v i is never zero, hence an inverse for ∇v i exists.
To bound the derivatives of (∇v i ) −1 , we use (1). Finally, the proof is completed by tuning the parameters ξ, δ in exactly the same manner as in the proof of Proposition 2.
A. Numerical analysis of convergence
For numerical analysis we consider the case of a single good, K = 1, with N = 31, η = 25 and quadratic utility functions ,
An example of quadratic utility function can be found in [31] , for the model of demand side management in smart-grids. The second derivative of v i (·) is 2θ i and thus for any agent i the value for θ i is chosen uniformly randomly in the range (−
As the model doesn't impose any restriction on the first derivative, the value for σ i is chosen uniformly randomly in the range (10, 20) . From the proof of Propositions 2, one can numerically calculate the value of parameters ξ, δ. For the particular instance of the random θ, σ generated to be used for the plots below, the parameter values are: ξ = 1 − (1.831 × 10 −4 ), δ = 1005.6 for the graph G being a full binary tree and ξ = 1 − (7.324 × 10 −4 ), δ = 932.3 for the graph being a sample of the Erdős-Reńyi random graph with only one connected component, where any two edges are connected with probability p = 0.3. The first graph represents a case of small average degree whereas the second one represents large average degree.
Since it has been shown that the best-response is a contraction mapping, one expects that any learning strategy that best-responds to some convex combination of past actions from finitely many rounds, converges at an exponential rate. Indeed, this is exactly observed in Fig. 2 , which plots the distance m n − m 2 between the action in round n to the NE m of the game G pvt , versus n. It also plots (in dashed line) the distance to optimum allocation, x(m n ) − x * 2 . The four cases considered in each figure are through two possible graphs and two possible learning dynamics. Exponential weight learning dynamic is when the action taken by any agent i at time n is the best-response to an exponentially weighed average of past actions, i.e., m n = β mn−1 2
, with r n = (m n + r n−1 )/2 . The 10−period average learning dynamic is the one where the actions are best-response to the average of actions from the past 10 rounds.
Since the learning iterations are essentially facilitating information exchange, the convergence ought to be faster for a graph that is more connected. From both the figures this is evident, as for each learning dynamic higher average degree Erdős-Reńyi random graph shows faster convergence than lower average degree Binary Tree. In fact, for both learning dynamics the convergence for the Erdős-Reńyi random graph is faster than either learning dynamic for Binary Tree. Comparing the two learning dynamics among themselves, we observe that the more aggressive exponential weighing leads to faster convergence compared to the learning dynamic that puts equal weight on each of the previous 10 actions. Finally, for Fig. 2 , in each case the relative distance to NE, defined as m n − m 2 / m 1 , is in the order of 10 −9 when the absolute distance to NE is 10 −3 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a distributed mechanism where agents only need to exchange messages locally with their neighbors. While for models with non-strategic agents, extensive research has been done in the field of distributed learning and optimization, this is not the case with mechanism design where agents are fully strategic. For every profile (v i (·)) i∈N of utility functions, the induced game is shown to have a unique NE. The allocation at equilibrium is efficient and taxes are budget balanced. Then we establish informational robustness of the mechanism by showing that the best-response in the induced game is a contraction mapping. This establishes that every learning dynamic within the ABR dynamics class converges to the unique and efficient NE when the game is played repeatedly. The ABR class contains learning dynamics such as Cournot best-response, k−period best-response and Fictitious Play.
Future Work: A significant scope for improvement in the presented mechanism is the reduction of the size of the message space. A more scalable mechanism would be one where on average each agent's message space is of dimension o(N ). However, such an attempt might possibly require restrictions on either the underlying graph G or the upper bound on η that is admissible under the model, or both. For the presented mechanism, neither the graph nor η have any restrictions. Another improvement can be that of considering more complicated constraint sets for the optimization (3). However, as can be seen from previous attempts at mechanism design for general constraint sets, [7] [8] [9] , [11] , [32] , such an extension is not straightforward. Finally, for preventing inter-temporal exchange of money during the learning phase, one can adjust taxes such that there is budget balance for all messages, rather than just at NE.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF LEMMA 1 (CONCAVITY)
Proof. Since the allocation and tax functions are smooth and v i (·) is continuously double-differentiable, to establish concavity we show that the Hessian of u i (m) w.r.t. m i is negative definite i.e., H ≺ 0. Once this is established, the optimization in (11) has a strictly concave objective and an unbounded constraint set. Thus it has a unique maximizer, defined by the first order derivative conditions.
The Hessian is of size (N + 1) × (N + 1) and we have
Since the Hessian is symmetric, we have
This implies that N − 1 eigenvalues of H are −2 and the remaining two satisfy
Since H is a symmetric matrix, all its eigenvalues are real. Due to v i (·) < 0, the product of roots in the above quadratic equation is positive and the sum of roots is negative. Thus the two remaining eigenvalues are negative as well.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (FULL IMPLEMENTATION)
Proof. For the private goods problem in (3), the optimality conditions in (4) are sufficient. Thus in order to prove that the corresponding allocation at NE is efficient, we show that at any NE m = (y, q) ∈ M, the allocation x i (m) i∈N and prices p i (m) i∈N satisfy the optimality conditions as x * and λ * 1 , respectively. Then using an invertibility argument we show existence and uniqueness of NE.
Using Lemma 1, at any NE m we have: ∇ mi u i (m) = 0, ∀ i ∈ N. This gives
Using the definitions in (9) and (10) 
Using the above and then combining (18a) with (9) and (10b) gives, ∀ i ∈ N, 
satisfy the optimality conditions, (4), as (x * , λ * 1 ). Since the optimality conditions are sufficient, the allocation at any NE m is the efficient allocation x * . For existence and uniqueness, consider the following set of linear equations that must be satisfied at any NE m,
Here y j j∈N are the variables and (x * , λ * 1 ) are fixed -since they are uniquely defined by the optimization (3). The above equations can be inverted to give the unique solution as,
